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SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
… the essential nature of war has not changed. Wars are fought by men, and there has been no discernible difference in the fundamental nature of man over the past five thousand years of recorded history. Because the nature of man has not changed, neither has his basic objective when he turns to war: the employment of lethal instruments to force his will upon other men with opposing points of view.
 Colonel N.T. Dupuy, Understanding War, 1987.
The transformation of the U.S. military and the Department of Defense represents a complex process which has been evolving since the end of the Cold War. Successful transformation will require a cultural change that focuses on producing forces that, when integrated with all elements of national power, will achieve desired effects to defeat any enemy's capabilities. The Army Transformation Roadmap suggests that the nation requires a joint force that can meet the strategic mandates established by the National Security Strategy (NSS) and further elaborated in the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG), and Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC).
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These documents provide the framework and concepts to determine the future path the military seeks, but it is the human dimension of transformation --the educated, well-trained, values oriented service member --that will have the greatest impact on the transformation process.
Technology is an enabler and a catalyst for change, but it is the practitioner of war that will determine how the technology will be employed to achieve desired effects and that will affect the cultural changes required to adapt to the changing security environment.
Transformation is commonly used to describe changes in organizations and equipment, but it has greater impact on the culture and members of the force. It is less important to change the things that forces use to make war than it is to change the way forces think about the effects they produce when using them. Transformation is an intellectual process and must begin with the mind of the leader. The leader must understand the emerging environment as projected in Joint Vision 2020, Defense Planning Guidance, and other assessments, and he must comprehend the adjustments that will be required to operate effectively in that environment. If services field new equipment and adopt new organizations, but continue to think about the application of force in the old ways then there is no material advantage. According to the Department of Defense's Planning Guidance, "Transformation is a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations that exploit our nation's advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world." 2 Transformation is incomplete if the focus is primarily on technology or organizational change rather than leadership and service culture. This concept is an attempt to overcome service parochialism and organizational culture in order to achieve the interdependence of joint forces. To defeat future potential capabilities that enemies might possess, this joint war-fighting concept postulates that the future joint force must be fully integrated, expeditionary, networked, decentralized, adaptable, decision-superior, and lethal. By adapting the forces to counter potential enemy capabilities, the concept envisions a force that can "achieve full spectrum dominance -the ability to sense, understand, decide, and act faster than any adversary in any situation." 7 Hence, the effectiveness of the joint force ultimately hinges on the human dimension which comprises the sensors, the decision makers, and the ones employing the capabilities to achieve the desired effects.
The Army's transformation strategy is to transform the Army culture through leadership and adaptive institutions, develop capabilities by conducting experimentation, analysis, and capabilities assessments in collaboration with the other services and Joint Forces Command, and then build the transformational capabilities into the joint force through training, exercises and simulations as well as evaluating these capabilities in real world operations whenever possible. 8 This strategy requires a global joint expeditionary land force that is ready, deployable and designed to fight as part of the joint force on land, so the Army must focus on how it will contribute to winning the joint warfight -not on moving the old force faster. 9 This concept forces the services to depend on each other. These collaborative efforts enhance trust and cooperation -both are part of the human dimension. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance efforts. These efforts must provide the commanders and staffs not in direct contact the ability to monitor, gain understanding of the situation, and anticipate requirements and changes to the plan without distracting the element in contact. These tools allow the commander to gain situational awareness and visualize the battlefield without being obtrusive on the subordinate element engaged in the fight. All efforts must be taken not to inflict centralized control "from afar" because this will have a detrimental effect on the immediate action and will undermine the initiative and confidence in the networked sensor system to assist the element in contact. The informational picture given does not present the full situation that the commander on the ground has since he is aware of the human and psychological factors which interact with the force. It is the uncertainty and friction that he must overcome to defeat the enemy. Understanding the limitations of technology is a critical component of usage. Hence the leader is the centerpiece of the process because he/she uses the input from these decision-making tools, like the Operational Net Assessment and the Collaborative Information Environment, and applies his/her experience, intuition, and his understanding of the human dimensions to make a determination on what actions to take.
When today's technology is working properly, it allows the commander the ability to maintain situational awareness and exercise battle command from great distances and while on the move. The commander's presence forward is still as critical to battlefield success as it was during the days of Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Grant, Lee, and Patton among others. This new capability resulted from an innovative approach to employing the Global Positioning System, originally designed as a military navigational aid. It was adapted for use as a guidance system, matched with small, powerful computer chips and a moveable fin system that allowed the munitions to "fly" within three meters of the desired target in an all-weather environment. 13 Once the munition was developed, it was adapted for use from multiple delivery systems. This innovative approach to use a "spin-off" technology to develop a new capability, combined with the creative approach to maximize its employment allowed forces to achieve effects with fewer rounds while causing less collateral damage.
The challenge in this process is to balance the capital investment directed toward the future force with the resources needed for the current force. Some technologies or concepts may provide the opportunity to advance capabilities for the current force. There are systems in place to devote valuable resources toward such "high-risk, high-payoff technologies" based on what will make this process successful. Military leaders must constantly remind the defense community that technology is not a "golden key" to success at any level. Service personnel are the hedge against the friction and fog of war that prevails during a campaign.
LEADERSHIP AND CULTURE
In the volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous environment we face for the foreseeable future, if we were to choose merely one advantage over our adversaries it would certainly be this: to be superior in the art of learning and adaptation. This is the imperative for a culture of innovation in the U.S. Army.
To provide the combatant commander a cohesive modular force with the required capabilities, the Army must focus on its core competencies which are to train and equip soldiers and grow leaders, and to provide relevant and ready land power capability to the combatant commander and the joint team. 16 The Army has already initiated actions to transform its culture through actions such as force stabilization and unit manning initiatives. To avoid the formation of ad hoc units, the establishment of cohesive teams that work and train together is key. These initiatives will allow the core elements of the Army's modular force packages, the units of action and units of employment, to maintain cohesive teams with well developed tactics, techniques, and procedures. These teams learn each others' strengths and weaknesses through tough, realistic training and exercises in order to maximize their strengths and minimize weaknesses.
This will increase confidence in leaders, systems, and themselves to provide combatant commanders with capabilities required on the battlefield.
Leader development and joint professional military education are critical components in assuring the seamless integration of the joint force. Focusing on leader development is necessary to adjust to a volatile, complex, uncertain, changing environment and the possibility of rapidly adapting enemies that U.S. forces may face in the future. The educated and welltrained leader whom the Army encouraged to be innovative and flexible is a basic requirement to focus Army culture on defeating competent and adaptive enemies, while integrating his force's capabilities into the joint war-fighting team. As Williamson Murray points out:
Perhaps the most important enabler of transformation and innovation in the past has been the culture of the military organizations that have grappled with an uncertain and ambiguous future, a future made more complex and difficult by tactical, operational, and technological changes, the impact of which are almost impossible to predict under peacetime conditions….If the American military does not desire to repeat the mistakes of the past, then it needs to create a learning culture, where intellectual preparation is as prized as tactical preparation.
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This concept is equally true today. An educated and learning culture is especially important as the Army works through organizational change, while confronting adaptive enemies. Soldiers are employing sophisticated equipment and are facing increasingly more complex tasks. They must be able to work with joint, interagency, and multinational partners, across the spectrum of operations, in a changing security environment. It is the human dimension --the educated, welltrained, values oriented service member --in this process that will determine the success of transformation to meet these demands.
TRAINING, EXERCISES, WARGAMING AND SIMULATIONS
Everyone has now seen that we fight as a joint team. Therefore, how can we best go about improving upon our already existing training to further bring in the notion and the concepts of joint? Here is our ultimate end state of training transformation: no individual, no unit, no staff would ever deploy into combat without first having experienced the rigors and the stress of their joint responsibilities in a robust and realistic training environment.
 Dr. Paul W. Mayberry, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Readiness
The services conduct numerous exercises and simulations to hone their skills and refine tactics, techniques, and procedures. These events provide the opportunity to evaluate different forms of operations against a variety of enemy forces under a wide range of environments.
Conducting tough, realistic training has been a hallmark of the U.S. military as well as a major contributor to recent successes. The Combat Training Centers with their aggressor forces and difficult terrain provide a unique testing and training environment. Conducting joint training to "train as we fight" will be a critical factor in developing soldiers who can employ the capabilities required by future combatant commanders.
When examining the enemy and his potential capabilities, U.S. forces need to insure that "Red teaming" provides a thinking, adapting adversary that resembles not only the enemy of today but those expected in the future. The Red forces must not be mirror images of U.S.
forces with the same values and expected behaviors. Moreover, training should include a level of realism that forces soldiers to appreciate the impact of casualty evacuation, extended operations that press the limits of the maintenance and resupply systems, refugee control, large numbers of enemy prisoners of war, consequence management from exposure to a weapon of mass destruction, loss of critical assets, and the loss of key leadership. Forces should exercise these events so leaders can think through solutions and work through issues before having to perform these functions on the battlefield. Too often these events are omitted from training because they are time consuming and difficult. Additionally, weather extremes, harsh terrain, complex and urban environments should be among the variables used in training to evaluate systems and concepts.
Simulations are limited in how well they can replicate the human dimension involved in warfighting, but they provide for larger force involvement in a terrain and resource constrained environment. Simulations provide a method to work through various scenarios in a combination of live, constructive, or virtual environment to achieve training objectives. An example of this effort is the Joint National Training Capability, which will combine training at the various major service training areas. This will allow service components to fight as a joint team through networked systems and synchronized efforts with the aim of achieving joint training objectives and testing various joint capabilities.
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There are new developments in the embedded training technology and automated teaching software systems known as intelligent tutoring systems. These technologies would either be built into new systems or developed in stand-alone systems that replicate the equipment that soldiers use. These systems will allow training in various scenarios without major resource expenditure by using digital terrain representations. The goal for these new systems is to allow individual and collective mission planning and rehearsal. 19 These systems allow for soldiers to progress at their own pace commensurate with their level of skill and experience. This contributes to providing a learning culture by giving soldiers the tools to hone their skills and prepare for future operations.
There is no substitute for actual maneuver and live-fire training to train forces and validate concepts and doctrine. The German experience in the interwar years prior to World
War II provides a historical example commonly used to demonstrate effective transformation.
The Versailles Treaty placed severe restrictions on German military manpower, equipment, and planning headquarters. Despite these restrictions, the Germans were able to develop a doctrine that incorporated mechanization and air power, emphasizing rapid operations. They also enhanced their ability to operate more decentralized by placing radios in a large number of their tanks. They had superior training programs, conducted field exercises and maneuvers, and conducted war gaming. It was the full participation and open, honest sharing of ideas, encouraged innovation, and thorough evaluation of lessons learned that enabled their transformation to be successful at the tactical level. 20 They effectively adapted their tactics, techniques, and procedures based on lessons learned and validation of concepts in actual combat operations over the two years prior to their invasion of France and the Soviet Union.
Had they used a framework similar to Gray's seventeen dimensions to view their experiences holistically, they might have avoided strategic failure. The United States should continually assess and reassess both friendly and potential enemy capabilities and not lose focus on the strategic factors of transformation. Otherwise it may make the same mistakes as the Germans, who emphasized transformation at the tactical level but failed to put enough effort on the strategic implications of transformation.
CASE STUDIES THAT SUPPORT CURRENT CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT
The key organizational transformation for the Army is the construct of modular, brigadesized units of action. These units are intended to be self-sufficient, highly-trained and skilled in their core competencies with the ability to leverage current technology, and adept at using emerging technology. This core element may require capabilities not resident in the unit of action. To minimize the negative effects of creating an ad hoc unit, the sooner the task organization can occur and the unit can train, rehearse, and operate together, the sooner the team can form up and prepare for combat. The team will perform much more effectively if it can conduct situational training exercises to insure its members know how to integrate their skills and capabilities into the effort, and can validate its tactics, techniques, and procedures.
An example of a capability not resident in a unit of action might be military dog teams.
This capability proved valuable in both Kosovo and Afghanistan for both explosive detection and crowd control. Linguistic and cultural expertise is another capability that is difficult to have resident in a unit of action. Prior to entering into a conflict, it is beneficial to conduct mission readiness exercises to prepare soldiers for the kinds of situations they might encounter. This helps familiarize them with language differences and how to deal with the local population. This proved of great value in Iraq, when intelligence initially identified a target at one location. Then after soldiers seized that target and questioned those at that location, they discovered the target was just a few houses away. Without the ability to communicate effectively with the local population, the mission could have failed completely. Instead, because of the quick thinking of the leader and the integration of the language capability, units achieved success.
The above incident highlights the need for effectively engaging and gaining the trust and confidence of the local population. In Kosovo, small units spent much time familiarizing themselves with the local population in the small villages. Patrols would immediately recognize new people or trusted local inhabitants would point out the "bad people" so units could pre-empt them. Many locals in Iraq have identified improvised explosive devices (IED) before they could harm U.S. soldiers or pointed out trouble makers before they could instigate further trouble.
This trust must go both ways, as guerrillas may end up targeting those who are assisting U.S.
forces, which has been happening in Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. Infusion of human interaction on the battlefield is crucial to strategic success.
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Additionally, the Army needs to conserve valuable resources by not trying to homogenize itself into a force with the most technological and expensive weapons now.
Soldiers need the right weapons and equipment to provide sufficient capabilities required by the combatant commander, but there needs to be a balance of resources consumed in mass production now rather than allow technology to mature and the equipment refinement process to work. The slow fielding timelines and the long lag time required to produce new systems may cause a lack of adequate resources to field the force with updated equipment in the future.
The efforts to transform concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations need to remain flexible, adaptable and versatile. These areas need to provide a broad range of capabilities that are rapidly developed, rigorously tested, experimented with, and evaluated by the users under realistic conditions. Capabilities should be modified to fix deficiencies and updated to incorporate any new technological improvements. If the Army can field these items to a small number of units of action and continually improve them, when certain items need to be fielded in mass to deal with a future major crisis, then the Army could produce and field the best, most trusted, most advanced pieces of equipment available at the time. An example is the current body armor. Units like the 75 th Ranger Regiment started using ceramic body armor in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The initial versions had only a front ceramic plate and the vest came up high on the neck. After use in many training events and exercises, the rangers discovered they had difficulty firing their weapon in the prone position because of the way the armor cut into the neck. In addition, the rangers needed back plates to protect the vital areas of gunners in vehicles or those firing crew served weapons, where their backs were exposed. Once
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM began, U.S. forces were on the fourth or fifth generation of improvements. The large amounts of armor vests fielded today have the benefit of the iterative improvements which resulted from ranger-user input. This demonstrates the importance of involving the user, the human dimension, early and continually throughout the process. Infantry. This ad hoc task force continued to change structure and rotate forces in and out throughout its six-month tour. Units performed numerous functions which were not in their normal core competencies. Composite squads ensured that proper expertise was available to provide the manpower to maintain the presence patrols required to secure a safe and stable environment that would allow the United Nations and the numerous nongovernmental and humanitarian assistance organizations to complete their missions. This is similar to the techniques used to complete normal combat engineer functions with a limited number of engineers. For example, in normal operations a core of engineer subject matter experts guide and supervise other non-engineer soldiers in the execution of engineer-related tasks.
Additionally, 1-26 th Infantry had just completed an organizational change and major weapons systems transitions while preparing for operations in Kosovo and while deployed to 
CONCLUSION
The human dimension will have the greatest impact on the transformation process.
Transformation is an intellectual process for which technology is an enabler and a catalyst for change. The practitioner of war is the one who innovates and determines how these technologies will be employed to produce the desired effects on enemy capabilities. The key to this cultural change required for transformation is in educating and training leaders, encouraging innovation and full participation in the process by all members of the services. The leadership with the experience, intuition and understanding of the human dimension will make the systems of war successful. It will require honest and realistic evaluation of organizational changes and doctrine, acceptance of new technologies and adoption of new processes, while maintaining flexibility and adaptability to adjust to a changing environment and potentially changing enemy capabilities.
The Army appears to be moving in the right direction with the modular brigade construct that intends to form cohesive core teams, reduce ad hoc formations, and implement force stabilization and unit manning initiatives. Human interaction on the battlefield by interoperable forces, using innovative approaches for achieving effects remains the key to success. People, organizations and doctrine determine how the joint forces will transform. Those involved in the transformation process can learn valuable lessons from past conflicts. The evaluation of each case study should be viewed holistically, based on the framework of sound strategic theory and principles, so the correct lesson can be extracted from the complex context of specific events.
Immature technologies and developing concepts presented in the above case studies demonstrate how user innovation and continual reassessment of lessons learned can evolve into future concepts and capabilities.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Department of Defense should conduct continual reass essment of strategic aims, the technologies available to conduct the war, and the tactics, techniques, and procedures used to prosecute the war. More importantly, joint forces must be able to maintain the flexibility and oriented service members, and this must continue despite the high operational tempo. The services need to create a learning organizational culture that encourages innovation and the willingness to take prudent risks. Forces need to be able to apply the required capabilities, at the right time and place to produce the required effects to defeat future enemy capabilities.
The joint force needs to invest more in the human dimension versus focusing on highdollar platforms. It needs to find a way to reduce the weight and bulk of the soldiers' load since they are required to carry more high technology equipment, almost all of which requires batteries. It needs to develop effective hybrid fueled vehicles or some similar more fuel efficient variant. These vehicles need to be more durable and require less maintenance to reduce the logistics tail required to support their effort, which will assist in reducing the forward footprint. [T] actical forms of war alter with political, economic, social, and technological change, war and strategy retain their integrity as distinctive phenomena." Gray presents his seventeen dimensions on page 24 and he further argues, based on his analysis of Clausewitz and Michael Howard that "strategy can be thought of usefully as having many broad, pervasive, and interpenetrating dimensions." He clusters his seventeen dimensions into three categories: The first is 'People and Politics', which comprises people; society; culture; politics; and ethics. The second category, 'Preparation for War', includes economics and logistics; organization (including recruitment, training, and most aspects of armament); information and intelligence; strategic theory and doctrine; and technology. The final category, 'War Proper', composes of military operations; command (political and military); geography; friction (including chance and uncertainty); the adversary; and time." Gray demonstrates the importance of strategic culture on page 25 stating "…while historical experience as interpreted by and for the present day is probably best considered in the (strategic) culture. For example, while U.S. strategy today can be said in part to be a product of American historical experience, that strategy is also the product of how Americans today choose to interpret their country's historical experience. 4 Ibid., 25. states, "Collaborative Information Environment (CIE) is a virtual aggregation of individuals, organizations, systems, infrastructure, and processes to create and share the data, information, and knowledge needed to plan, execute, and assess joint force operations and enable a commander to make decisions better and faster than the adversary." United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JISR) Concept Primer, October 2003 states, "Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JISR) is a netcentric approach to the management of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, aimed at supporting the demands of the joint war-fighter across all domains and all levels of war." United States Joint Forces Command, Operational Net Assessment (ONA) Concept Primer, October 2003 states, "Operational Net Assessment (ONA) provides a methodology and framework used to develop a coherent, relevant, and common understanding of the operating environment, of the adversary as an adaptive entity within that environment, and of ourselves."
